[CORE] Reduce the xCTR Unstaking Period to 14 Days with a 3-Day Minimum Exit Period
Proposal type: CORE
Status: Active
Author: Citrea Core Team
Created: 9 June 2026
Affected component: xCTR staking contract exit parameters
Governance Links
Forum discussion: This thread
Citrea DAO proposal: CORE-10: Reduce the xCTR Unstaking Period to 14 Days with a 3-Day Minimum Exit Period
Summary
This CORE proposal reduces the xCTR unstaking window from 90 days to 14 days, with a 3-day minimum exit period. The existing 50% maximum penalty is retained, with the penalty decaying linearly from 50% to 0% between day 3 and day 14.
This is an executable parameter-change proposal. If approved and executed through Citrea governance, the xCTR staking contract’s exit parameters will be updated using the contract’s existing parameter setter.
The proposed change only updates existing staking-contract parameters. It does not introduce new contract logic.
Motivation
Lower the barrier to staking and governance participation
The current 90-day exit schedule may discourage CTR holders who are unwilling to accept a 3-month liquidity horizon.
Reducing the maximum exit duration to 14 days provides participants with greater flexibility while preserving a meaningful cost for immediate and early exits. This may increase the amount of CTR staked, broaden participation in xCTR governance and reduce the concentration of voting power.
Better balance commitment and capital flexibility
The current parameters require stakers to accept substantial liquidity and price exposure in exchange for participating in governance.
The proposed schedule retains a delayed exit mechanism and the existing 50% maximum penalty while allowing the penalty to decay over a shorter period.
Limited demonstrated need for the current duration
The current xCTR governance and staking design does not appear to rely on a 90-day exit period.
Because the unstaking duration and penalty rates remain governable parameters, they may be revisited if future governance, application or security requirements justify a longer commitment period.
Specification
Current Parameters
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Maximum unstaking duration | 90 days |
| Minimum exit duration | 15 days |
| Instant exit penalty | 50% |
| Penalty decay | Linear from 50% to 0% between day 15 and day 90 |
Proposed Parameters
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Maximum unstaking duration | 14 days |
| Minimum exit duration | 3 days |
| Instant exit penalty | 50% |
| Penalty decay | Linear from 50% to 0% between day 3 and day 14 |
Resulting Penalty Schedule
| Exit timing | Penalty | User receives |
|---|---|---|
| Instant | 50% | 50% |
| Day 3 | 50% | 50% |
| Day 6 | ~36% | ~64% |
| Day 9 | ~23% | ~77% |
| Day 12 | ~9% | ~91% |
| Day 14 or later | 0% | 100% |
Rationale for the Selected Parameters
The proposed 14-day maximum duration preserves a meaningful separation between staking and full liquidity while materially reducing the current 90-day commitment.
The 3-day minimum exit duration retains a delay before an exit may be completed through the standard decaying-penalty path. Instant exits remain available at the existing 50% penalty.
The 50% maximum penalty is unchanged. This preserves the existing deterrent against immediate exits while reducing the time required for the penalty to decay to zero.
Risks and Trade-offs
Reducing the exit period may make xCTR participation less sticky and allow voting power to leave the system more quickly in response to governance decisions or market volatility.
It may also increase short-term fluctuations in the total amount of CTR staked.
These risks are partially mitigated by retaining the 50% instant-exit penalty, preserving a minimum exit duration and keeping the parameters adjustable through governance.
Treatment of In-Flight Exits
Unstaking positions initiated before this proposal executes are expected to continue under the parameter schedule in effect when they were initiated.
The new 14-day schedule applies only to exits initiated after activation.
Stakers with an in-flight exit who prefer the new schedule may cancel, if cancellation is still available for their position, and re-initiate after activation. Otherwise, they may finalize under their original terms.
Implementation
This proposal makes a single call to the xCTR staking contract’s existing parameter setter.
Target contract: 0x2015F35030A8Ff2C0CA161a865414996F8E80AA4
Function call:
setExitParams(
259_200, // minExitDuration_: 3 days
1_209_600, // maxExitDuration_: 14 days
0, // minExitPenaltyBps_: 0%
5_000, // maxExitPenaltyBps_: 50%
5_000 // instantExitPenaltyBps_: 50%
);
The penalty decays linearly from maxExitPenaltyBps at minExitDuration to minExitPenaltyBps at maxExitDuration.
Instant exits incur instantExitPenaltyBps.
No contract logic changes are required.
Activation
The new parameters take effect once this CORE proposal is approved and the executable payload is executed through Citrea governance.
After activation, newly initiated xCTR exits will follow the updated 14-day schedule.
Expected Outcome
If this proposal is not vetoed and is executed:
-
The xCTR maximum unstaking duration will be reduced from 90 days to 14 days.
-
The minimum exit duration will be reduced from 15 days to 3 days.
-
The instant exit penalty will remain 50%.
-
The penalty will decay linearly from 50% to 0% between day 3 and day 14.
-
No contract logic will be changed.
-
Existing in-flight exits are expected to remain under their original schedule.